[Culturechat] Stratfor.com on the EU Constitution
WesTexas@aol.com
WesTexas@aol.com
Thu, 26 May 2005 09:27:20 EDT
-------------------------------1117114040
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Language: en
=20
THE GEOPOLITICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
=20
The European Crisis
May 24, 2005 19:38 GMT
=20
France will vote on the new draft European constitution May 29. All 25 EU
members must ratify the constitution if it is to take effect. The odds of
that happening are pretty slim under any circumstances. However, at the
moment it appears that the referendum in France might fail. Whether it
actually does is less significant than the fact that France is the engine
behind European unification -- and if ratification of the constitution in
France is in doubt, it is difficult to imagine how it could possibly pass i=
n
many other European countries.
=20
In other words, if unification is a question mark in France, then an EU
constitution is not going to pass in its current form, if at all.
=20
This is a dramatic shift in Europe. During the 1990s, the emergence of a
transnational European state appeared to be a foregone conclusion. The
introduction of the euro seemed to make this inevitable. The new currency
made it possible to place control of Europe's money supply in the hands of=20=
a
transnational central bank. It made little sense to have a European currenc=
y
without a European state -- it was like wearing a tie without a shirt.
Therefore, since at least part of Europe accept the euro with relative ease=
,
it appeared to follow that the framing document -- a constitution -- would
readily follow.
=20
But there is a huge difference in the ways political systems function in
relatively prosperous times and in more austere times. Things that are
acceptable when the economy is healthy become less tolerable -- or
intolerable -- when the economy is weak. This does not mean that the primar=
y
issue is economic. The chief obstacle to an EU constitution in France and
elsewhere is political and social -- it is the unwillingness to abandon
sovereignty. This sensibility is always there, but it is activated when the
political ambitions of the new regime interact with hard times. This is
doubly the case when people believe that their own problems and votes might
have no bearing on the actions or policies of the new political system.
=20
This dilemma is symbolized by the nature of the new constitution -- it is
300 pages long. A constitution must define the regime. It must define
institutions and the limits on those institutions. It must define individua=
l
rights and, in a federal system, the rights of nonfederal governments. Abov=
e
all, it must be terse. The more complex it is, the less the ordinary citize=
n
can trust it.
=20
A 300-page constitution, by dint of its very size, sums up the first proble=
m
facing Europe: The EU is governed by a bureaucracy whose ways cannot be
understood by ordinary citizens, and which does not intend itself to be
understood. It is therefore not trusted. A second problem is that the
constitution is made up of a series of staggeringly complex compromises tha=
t
defy clear understanding. If American constitutional law is complex,
European constitutional law, as written, is beyond comprehension, let alone
debate.
=20
The voters simply don't know what they are voting for. Even if they did
favor the principle of European unification, no one really knows, under thi=
s
constitution, precisely what they would be committing to. This is not a
solvable problem. The complexity is inevitable. It derives from an
understanding of Europe that relies on specialists rather than citizen-
politicians, and an uneasiness among nations that has resulted in a
compromise of bewildering complexity. The Europeans either have an
incomprehensible constitution, or they have no chance of agreeing on one at
all.
=20
Beneath the complexity of the task lies politics.
=20
There were two reasons for creating the EU. The first was to build
institutions that would prevent a fourth war between France and Germany. Th=
e
catastrophic record of European statesmanship created the impulse to tie th=
e
hands of European politicians by creating overarching institutions. In othe=
r
words, transnationalism was designed to overcome Europe's ruinous
nationalism.
=20
Second, the European Union, and the European Community before it, were
designed to facilitate European prosperity. It was reasonably assumed that=20=
a
Europe without protectionist barriers would do better than a Europe
fragmented into multiple, exclusionary markets. On this level, the EU had a
purely utilitarian goal: It was designed for economic ends, and the only
justification for its existence was how readily it achieved those ends and
how universally it could distribute those benefits across national lines.
The European Union was designed to allow Europe to be competitive in the
global marketplace.
=20
Preventing war and generating prosperity are not trivial goals, but they
lack the moral drive possessed by the great revolutionary regimes -- France=
,
the United States, the Soviet Union. What binds the EU together is a dream
of peace and prosperity. One might argue that this is a more reasonable goa=
l
than "Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite." But it is also judged by a different
standard: It is possible to sacrifice all to "Workers of the World Unite" o=
r
"We hold these truths to be self-evident =E2=80=A6" But a regime founded on=
the
principles of safety and prosperity cannot demand sacrifice that threatens
either. The idea of a united Europe is not a moral project -- it is a
mutually beneficial contract that has no moral hold once those benefits are
no longer safeguarded.
=20
This gives the idea of Europe a fundamental fragility. A political system
that has no basis on which to justify hardship cannot endure hardship, and
hardship is the one certainty that comes to all regimes. In this immediate
case, Europe -- or at least France, Germany and Italy, the center of gravit=
y
of Europe -- is in serious economic trouble. Growth has slowed to only 1.5
percent per year while unemployment has climbed into the double digits. For
these three countries, the EU model is simply not delivering on prosperity.
=20
The existence of a European Central Bank has complicated the situation
rather than simplified it. All the countries that have adopted the euro as
their currency now are subject to the monetary policies of the European
Central Bank. Europe is an extraordinarily diverse place, becoming more
diverse every time a new country enters the union or an old one accepts the
euro. The ECB has followed policies designed to support the three major
members of the euro bloc -- but not all of the euro bloc states are in the
same economic position. The problem is that a single policy must hurt some
and help others. Since the promise of prosperity is the foundation of the
system, how do you keep those who lose out from central bank policies in th=
e
system? More to the immediate point, how do you expand the system to give
the European state more power when the benefits of the current system becom=
e
increasingly unclear?
=20
What is interesting, of course, is that the ECB is being extremely
solicitous of French needs, and France has been able to simply ignore the
stabilization pact that required it to bring its budget into balance. Franc=
e
has been the beneficiary of the system, yet the new constitution is being
strongly challenged in France.
=20
The reason has to do with the first goal of the European system -- security=
.
The old threat to security was a continuation of Europe's wars. But now a
new threat -- immigration -- is perceived. Immigration appears threatening
on two levels: Economically, it increases competition for jobs; socially, i=
t
increases diversity. From an economist's point of view, job competition
increases efficiency, while social diversity is a non-quantifiable
irrelevancy. They miss the point, to say the least.
=20
In the long run, austerity imposed by job competition and restructuring
might be beneficial to an economy. But a 10- or 20-year dose of austerity
measures will devastate an entire generation. A person who cannot get
satisfactory employment from the age of 25 to 40 has had his life gutted.
The time scale of a human life and the time scale of economic theory do not
mesh. In effect, economic theory creates competition between this generatio=
n
and the next -- and the members of this generation, being alive, tend to
win.
=20
Europe either must undergo a massive reinvention or sink into the abyss. In
either case, a generation of European workers will pay the price. Like all
humans, they will blame someone, and the most logical target -- whether
valid or not -- is the immigrant population, whose presence they see as the
catalyst for the problem.
=20
There is a deeper level to this. France is France. France was very happy to
go to Algeria and declare it "France." Its people have been much less happy
to have Algerians come to France and declare it "Algeria." Whatever the
irony of it, France is changing demographically, with the inevitable result
that many French -- particularly those outside the corporate elite -- don't
want their country to change. Even more to the point, some feel that they
are losing control of their country to immigrants, and that they no longer
have the sovereign right to determine the kind of society they will have.
=20
The EU constitution institutionalizes that powerlessness. The doctrines
embedded in the EU recognize the right of immigration from one country to
another: Once you have citizenship somewhere, you have the right to go
anywhere within the union. This might make sense from an economist's view o=
f
labor markets, but it means that France no longer controls its fate. When
Turkey enters the EU, the perception is, an avalanche of Muslim immigrants
will sweep France, and the European government's bureaucrats will celebrate
the shift instead of stopping it. The guarantees of security are being kept
in preventing nation-states from fighting, but not -- it is perceived -- in
protecting the traditional way of life in France and other countries.
=20
The issue only partly concerns migration. The deeper issue is sovereignty.
The government of France is asking its people essentially to transfer major
elements of sovereignty to a state that France cannot control. The French d=
o
not see a common identity with the rest of Europe, and the rest of Europe
does not see a common identity with France. The EU is rooted in an alliance
of convenience that is rapidly becoming inconvenient.
=20
We do not know what will happen with the French referendum on May 29, but
the important thing already has happened. If France cannot be absolutely
counted on to vote for the constitution, then the constitution is dead. The
founders of the EU would have trouble understanding the issue -- they took
their bearings from economic theory and built the system to overcome
nationalism, which they saw as the problem.
=20
Nationalism is, however, a foundation of the human experience. We all have
our roots in a community, and economics is far from the only value we
pursue. Adam Smith knew this, which is why he called his masterpiece "The
Wealth of Nations." Nationalism is not an unfortunate and archaic impedimen=
t
to a more perfect society; it is simply an omnipresent feature of human
life. Like greed, it can be condemned, if you get pleasure from doing so,
but it never goes away and can never be controlled.
=20
The EU was designed to overcome nationalism. The best it could do has been
to mitigate it. In placing some nations at an economic disadvantage through
its central bank and leaving others socially vulnerable by its immigration
policies, the EU has not submerged nationalism, but energized it. The EU
increases the threat to its own long-term existence every time it tries to
extend its authority, institutionally or geographically.
=20
If French support for the EU can no longer be taken for granted, then
nothing can be taken for granted.
=20
_http://www.stratfor.com_ (http://www.stratfor.com/)=20
=20
-------------------------------1117114040
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Language: en
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; charset=3DUTF-8">
<META content=3D"MSHTML 6.00.2900.2627" name=3DGENERATOR></HEAD>
<BODY id=3Drole_body style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: #000000; FONT-FAMILY:=20=
Arial"=20
bottomMargin=3D7 leftMargin=3D7 topMargin=3D7 rightMargin=3D7><FONT id=3Drol=
e_document=20
face=3DArial color=3D#000000 size=3D2>
<DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>THE GEOPOLITICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT</FONT>=
</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>The European Crisis<BR>May 24, 2005 19:38&n=
bsp;=20
GMT</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>France will vote on the new draft European=20
constitution May 29. All 25 EU<BR>members must ratify the constitution if it=
is=20
to take effect. The odds of<BR>that happening are pretty slim under any=20
circumstances. However, at the<BR>moment it appears that the referendum in=20
France might fail. Whether it<BR>actually does is less significant than the=20=
fact=20
that France is the engine<BR>behind European unification -- and if ratificat=
ion=20
of the constitution in<BR>France is in doubt, it is difficult to imagine how=
it=20
could possibly pass in<BR>many other European countries.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>In other words, if unification is a questio=
n mark=20
in France, then an EU<BR>constitution is not going to pass in its current fo=
rm,=20
if at all.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>This is a dramatic shift in Europe. During=20=
the=20
1990s, the emergence of a<BR>transnational European state appeared to be a=20
foregone conclusion. The<BR>introduction of the euro seemed to make this=20
inevitable. The new currency<BR>made it possible to place control of Europe'=
s=20
money supply in the hands of a<BR>transnational central bank. It made little=
=20
sense to have a European currency<BR>without a European state -- it was like=
=20
wearing a tie without a shirt.<BR>Therefore, since at least part of Europe=20
accept the euro with relative ease,<BR>it appeared to follow that the framin=
g=20
document -- a constitution -- would<BR>readily follow.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>But there is a huge difference in the ways=20
political systems function in<BR>relatively prosperous times and in more aus=
tere=20
times. Things that are<BR>acceptable when the economy is healthy become less=
=20
tolerable -- or<BR>intolerable -- when the economy is weak. This does not me=
an=20
that the primary<BR>issue is economic. The chief obstacle to an EU constitut=
ion=20
in France and<BR>elsewhere is political and social -- it is the unwillingnes=
s to=20
abandon<BR>sovereignty. This sensibility is always there, but it is activate=
d=20
when the<BR>political ambitions of the new regime interact with hard times.=20=
This=20
is<BR>doubly the case when people believe that their own problems and votes=20
might<BR>have no bearing on the actions or policies of the new political=20
system.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>This dilemma is symbolized by the nature of=
the new=20
constitution -- it is<BR>300 pages long. A constitution must define the regi=
me.=20
It must define<BR>institutions and the limits on those institutions. It must=
=20
define individual<BR>rights and, in a federal system, the rights of nonfeder=
al=20
governments. Above<BR>all, it must be terse. The more complex it is, the les=
s=20
the ordinary citizen<BR>can trust it.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>A 300-page constitution, by dint of its ver=
y size,=20
sums up the first problem<BR>facing Europe: The EU is governed by a bureaucr=
acy=20
whose ways cannot be<BR>understood by ordinary citizens, and which does not=20
intend itself to be<BR>understood. It is therefore not trusted. A second pro=
blem=20
is that the<BR>constitution is made up of a series of staggeringly complex=20
compromises that<BR>defy clear understanding. If American constitutional law=
is=20
complex,<BR>European constitutional law, as written, is beyond comprehension=
,=20
let alone<BR>debate.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>The voters simply don't know what they are=20=
voting=20
for. Even if they did<BR>favor the principle of European unification, no one=
=20
really knows, under this<BR>constitution, precisely what they would be=20
committing to. This is not a<BR>solvable problem. The complexity is inevitab=
le.=20
It derives from an<BR>understanding of Europe that relies on specialists rat=
her=20
than citizen-<BR>politicians, and an uneasiness among nations that has resul=
ted=20
in a<BR>compromise of bewildering complexity. The Europeans either have=20
an<BR>incomprehensible constitution, or they have no chance of agreeing on o=
ne=20
at<BR>all.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Beneath the complexity of the task lies=20
politics.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>There were two reasons for creating the EU.=
The=20
first was to build<BR>institutions that would prevent a fourth war between=20
France and Germany. The<BR>catastrophic record of European statesmanship cre=
ated=20
the impulse to tie the<BR>hands of European politicians by creating overarch=
ing=20
institutions. In other<BR>words, transnationalism was designed to overcome=20
Europe's ruinous<BR>nationalism.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Second, the European Union, and the Europea=
n=20
Community before it, were<BR>designed to facilitate European prosperity. It=20=
was=20
reasonably assumed that a<BR>Europe without protectionist barriers would do=20
better than a Europe<BR>fragmented into multiple, exclusionary markets. On t=
his=20
level, the EU had a<BR>purely utilitarian goal: It was designed for economic=
=20
ends, and the only<BR>justification for its existence was how readily it=20
achieved those ends and<BR>how universally it could distribute those benefit=
s=20
across national lines.<BR>The European Union was designed to allow Europe to=
be=20
competitive in the<BR>global marketplace.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Preventing war and generating prosperity ar=
e not=20
trivial goals, but they<BR>lack the moral drive possessed by the great=20
revolutionary regimes -- France,<BR>the United States, the Soviet Union. Wha=
t=20
binds the EU together is a dream<BR>of peace and prosperity. One might argue=
=20
that this is a more reasonable goal<BR>than "Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite."=20=
But=20
it is also judged by a different<BR>standard: It is possible to sacrifice al=
l to=20
"Workers of the World Unite" or<BR>"We hold these truths to be self-evident=20=
=E2=80=A6"=20
But a regime founded on the<BR>principles of safety and prosperity cannot de=
mand=20
sacrifice that threatens<BR>either. The idea of a united Europe is not a mor=
al=20
project -- it is a<BR>mutually beneficial contract that has no moral hold on=
ce=20
those benefits are<BR>no longer safeguarded.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>This gives the idea of Europe a fundamental=
=20
fragility. A political system<BR>that has no basis on which to justify hards=
hip=20
cannot endure hardship, and<BR>hardship is the one certainty that comes to a=
ll=20
regimes. In this immediate<BR>case, Europe -- or at least France, Germany an=
d=20
Italy, the center of gravity<BR>of Europe -- is in serious economic trouble.=
=20
Growth has slowed to only 1.5<BR>percent per year while unemployment has cli=
mbed=20
into the double digits. For<BR>these three countries, the EU model is simply=
not=20
delivering on prosperity.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>The existence of a European Central Bank ha=
s=20
complicated the situation<BR>rather than simplified it. All the countries th=
at=20
have adopted the euro as<BR>their currency now are subject to the monetary=20
policies of the European<BR>Central Bank. Europe is an extraordinarily diver=
se=20
place, becoming more<BR>diverse every time a new country enters the union or=
an=20
old one accepts the<BR>euro. The ECB has followed policies designed to suppo=
rt=20
the three major<BR>members of the euro bloc -- but not all of the euro bloc=20
states are in the<BR>same economic position. The problem is that a single po=
licy=20
must hurt some<BR>and help others. Since the promise of prosperity is the=20
foundation of the<BR>system, how do you keep those who lose out from central=
=20
bank policies in the<BR>system? More to the immediate point, how do you expa=
nd=20
the system to give<BR>the European state more power when the benefits of the=
=20
current system become<BR>increasingly unclear?</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>What is interesting, of course, is that the=
ECB is=20
being extremely<BR>solicitous of French needs, and France has been able to=20
simply ignore the<BR>stabilization pact that required it to bring its budget=
=20
into balance. France<BR>has been the beneficiary of the system, yet the new=20
constitution is being<BR>strongly challenged in France.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>The reason has to do with the first goal of=
the=20
European system -- security.<BR>The old threat to security was a continuatio=
n of=20
Europe's wars. But now a<BR>new threat -- immigration -- is perceived.=20
Immigration appears threatening<BR>on two levels: Economically, it increases=
=20
competition for jobs; socially, it<BR>increases diversity. From an economist=
's=20
point of view, job competition<BR>increases efficiency, while social diversi=
ty=20
is a non-quantifiable<BR>irrelevancy. They miss the point, to say the=20
least.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>In the long run, austerity imposed by job=20
competition and restructuring<BR>might be beneficial to an economy. But a 10=
- or=20
20-year dose of austerity<BR>measures will devastate an entire generation. A=
=20
person who cannot get<BR>satisfactory employment from the age of 25 to 40 ha=
s=20
had his life gutted.<BR>The time scale of a human life and the time scale of=
=20
economic theory do not<BR>mesh. In effect, economic theory creates competiti=
on=20
between this generation<BR>and the next -- and the members of this generatio=
n,=20
being alive, tend to<BR>win.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Europe either must undergo a massive reinve=
ntion or=20
sink into the abyss. In<BR>either case, a generation of European workers wil=
l=20
pay the price. Like all<BR>humans, they will blame someone, and the most log=
ical=20
target -- whether<BR>valid or not -- is the immigrant population, whose pres=
ence=20
they see as the<BR>catalyst for the problem.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>There is a deeper level to this. France is=20=
France.=20
France was very happy to<BR>go to Algeria and declare it "France." Its peopl=
e=20
have been much less happy<BR>to have Algerians come to France and declare it=
=20
"Algeria." Whatever the<BR>irony of it, France is changing demographically,=20=
with=20
the inevitable result<BR>that many French -- particularly those outside the=20
corporate elite -- don't<BR>want their country to change. Even more to the=20
point, some feel that they<BR>are losing control of their country to immigra=
nts,=20
and that they no longer<BR>have the sovereign right to determine the kind of=
=20
society they will have.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>The EU constitution institutionalizes that=20
powerlessness. The doctrines<BR>embedded in the EU recognize the right of=20
immigration from one country to<BR>another: Once you have citizenship somewh=
ere,=20
you have the right to go<BR>anywhere within the union. This might make sense=
=20
from an economist's view of<BR>labor markets, but it means that France no lo=
nger=20
controls its fate. When<BR>Turkey enters the EU, the perception is, an avala=
nche=20
of Muslim immigrants<BR>will sweep France, and the European government's=20
bureaucrats will celebrate<BR>the shift instead of stopping it. The guarante=
es=20
of security are being kept<BR>in preventing nation-states from fighting, but=
not=20
-- it is perceived -- in<BR>protecting the traditional way of life in France=
and=20
other countries.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>The issue only partly concerns migration. T=
he=20
deeper issue is sovereignty.<BR>The government of France is asking its peopl=
e=20
essentially to transfer major<BR>elements of sovereignty to a state that Fra=
nce=20
cannot control. The French do<BR>not see a common identity with the rest of=20
Europe, and the rest of Europe<BR>does not see a common identity with France=
.=20
The EU is rooted in an alliance<BR>of convenience that is rapidly becoming=20
inconvenient.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>We do not know what will happen with the Fr=
ench=20
referendum on May 29, but<BR>the important thing already has happened. If Fr=
ance=20
cannot be absolutely<BR>counted on to vote for the constitution, then the=20
constitution is dead. The<BR>founders of the EU would have trouble understan=
ding=20
the issue -- they took<BR>their bearings from economic theory and built the=20
system to overcome<BR>nationalism, which they saw as the problem.</FONT></DI=
V>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Nationalism is, however, a foundation of th=
e human=20
experience. We all have<BR>our roots in a community, and economics is far fr=
om=20
the only value we<BR>pursue. Adam Smith knew this, which is why he called hi=
s=20
masterpiece "The<BR>Wealth of Nations." Nationalism is not an unfortunate an=
d=20
archaic impediment<BR>to a more perfect society; it is simply an omnipresent=
=20
feature of human<BR>life. Like greed, it can be condemned, if you get pleasu=
re=20
from doing so,<BR>but it never goes away and can never be=20
controlled.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>The EU was designed to overcome nationalism=
. The=20
best it could do has been<BR>to mitigate it. In placing some nations at an=20
economic disadvantage through<BR>its central bank and leaving others sociall=
y=20
vulnerable by its immigration<BR>policies, the EU has not submerged national=
ism,=20
but energized it. The EU<BR>increases the threat to its own long-term existe=
nce=20
every time it tries to<BR>extend its authority, institutionally or=20
geographically.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>If French support for the EU can no longer=20=
be taken=20
for granted, then<BR>nothing can be taken for granted.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><A title=3Dhttp://www.stratfor.com/=20
href=3D"http://www.stratfor.com/">http://www.stratfor.com</A></FONT></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV></DIV></FONT></BODY></HTML>
-------------------------------1117114040--